Voices of 1918; Captain Harry S. Truman’s Combat Experience in World War I - Part 3 of 5

The 35th Division’s Withdrawal from the Meuse-Argonne Offensive

Battery D removed two entire batteries from the German's order of battle and did serious operational damage to a third battery.  Nonetheless, the 35th was still taking serious damage. Extremely anxious about the ability of the 35th to accomplish their mission or even hold the line, General Pershing went forward on 28 September to see first-hand what was going on.  Upon interviewing the commander, General Traub detailed the terrible flanking fire from Apremont and the Argonne Forest and explained that he was unable to respond because of the First Army's standing order forbidding divisions from firing outside of their own battle area.  An astounded and appalled Pershing replied, "But surely you do not obey that order?" From that point on, the 35th's artillery was encouraged to engage targets in the 28th’s sector but the damage had already been done by allowing the German guns to slip under and through the Allies’ covering fire. (Giangreco, 2002.)

Shot down German biplane in the Argonne, 4 Oct., 1918

The 35th's assault on 29 September at Exermont was thrown back with great losses and the ensuing German counterattacks nearly succeeded in breaking the American lines.  (Gilwee, 2000.)

However, Truman once again showed what an analytical, decisive leader he was.  During the German counterattacks, he turned his anti-aircraft machineguns into anti-personnel defensive weapons, set them into defensive positions and began blasting the attacking enemy.  In the fatalistic attitude that often creeps into the combat Soldier, this piece of terrain that they were fighting over was dubbed, "a cemetery of unburied dead.”  (Giangreco, 2002)


As a result of the disproportionate and unacceptably large numbers of casualties inflicted on the 35th Division, as well as some tactical blunders made by the senior command structure, the 35th was deemed to be rendered infective.  The 1st Division then moved up and replaced the 35th.  They, in turn, suffered 6,000-plus casualties in this same area until the end of the operation and the war.

Even though the Infantry of the 35th Division had been rendered ineffective, Battery D was still operational beyond all expectations.  Mr. Wooden noted, “They kept us there for four days to support the artillery of the First Division, you see. They couldn't get their artillery up. We finally got a letter of recommendation from the major general of the First Division for backing them up.”  It was a horrific time, but it could have been worse.

Artillery crew pulling gun out of the mud of the battle area.

Amazingly, virtually all the casualties of the 35th occurred within a three mile radius of Truman's artillery battery as it fought and moved forward through the battlefield.  The battery was bombed and strafed by air, hit with incoming mustard gas and high explosive artillery, ambushed by dug-in and camouflaged machinegun nests, and attacked by infantry.  Yet, for the entirety of Truman’s combat command (11 July, 1918 through the end of the war on 11 November, 1918,) not one man was killed in his battery and only two were wounded.  This was a feat that requires forethought, tactical ability, organizational skills as well as luck.  As said by Mr. Leigh, “There's such a thing as sticking your battery in a spot where they shouldn't be, you know, and Truman didn't make those mistakes.”

For example, on one occasion the battery’s firing position had been detected and counter fire had been called in on them.  The enemy observer walked in rounds and had bracketed their position.  In lightning quick response, Battery D hitched up and started to move out.  Just as the enemy order for fire for effect had been complied with, the last of the caissons had rolled on.  Unfortunately, the only cover and concealment for them to quickly roll into was in-between the lines of “No Man’s Land” and there they had got stuck in the mud.  They got into a significant depression and were not observable but the Germans knew they were there and were searching them out with their artillery.  One wagon got hit and a man seeking cover in a shell hole had an incoming dud hit right between his legs.  They stayed where they were until well past dark; then pulled what equipment they could out of the mud.  It was 3am before they reached the adjoining woods.  Two carriages had to be left behind and the remnants are probably still there.  As for the men, nobody received so much as a scratch.


That there were no casualties was attributable to CPT Truman’s forethought in planning for possible counter-fire and knowledge of the depression.  Furthermore, that this depression that they used was in “No Man’s Land” wasn’t what the opposing observer would have expected or planned for, giving the battery a little extra time.  The move was successfully accomplished in a rapid manner, which required a huge amount of training and discipline as well as cool thinking. 

Battery D went through a lot during both the build up and offensive and the actual battle.  “There were some three or four weeks from September 10 to October 6 that I did nothing but march at night and shoot or sleep in daylight.”  (Truman, 8 Oct., 1918)  The men ate on the march or caught a bite behind their guns and sleep was a luxury.  On several occasions, Truman went more than two and a half days without sleep.  After one such stint, he was ordered to rest by his battalion commanding officer.  He slept for 24 straight hours, which happened more than once.  “Once I was up so long I thought I never would want to go to bed any more.”  (Truman, 15 Nov., 1918)

“It was the most terrific experience of my life and I hope I don't have to go through with it many more times” (Truman, 30 Oct., 1918)

Come back Friday for Voices of 1918; part 4 of 5